W
ITH the division of each state into counties or districts and the creation in each such subdivision of some court for the probate of wills and the ad ministration of estates, it became necessary to designate which of such ' courts should undertake these functions in a par ticular estate. It is not the purpose of this study to consider problems arising out of conflicts of jurisdiction as between states insofar as independent determinations of domicile of a decedent may be made. . That a decedent died a resident of the state undertaking an administration upon his estate will be assumed ; or, if he died a nonresident, that there are assets within the state justifying administration. T h is study is con cerned solely with the designation and determination of the county within the state where such probate and administration should be entertained and carried out.
Historically, venue in civil actions meant the county in Eng land to which process was issued to the sheriff to bring a jury from that county to Westminster, and later to the county in which the trial was to be had. This fitted in well with the pro cedural plan then prevailing for summoning the jurors, who were presumably acquainted with the facts, from the very com munity where the cause of action arose. But when jurors ceased to make findings on their own knowledge, a jury could be drawn from the community of trial, and at the same time it became possible-indeed necessary-to determine venue in advance of trial. It is not possible here to trace the elements which have found their way into statutes for determining venue I in civil actions. Suffice it to say that these statutes bear various *Originally printed as an article in 43 Micjl. L. Rev. 471 ( 1944) . marks of the place where the cause of action arose, where one or more of the parties to the action resided, or where the de fendant might be found. 1 In the English ecclesiastical courts venue for determining the place of administration upon the estate ot a decedent de veloped in a wholly different setting. The ordinary ec clesiastical courts had jurisdiction to probate wills and grant letters upon the estate of a decedent who died, or who was domiciled, within the diocese.2 Where, however, the decedent was possessed of bona notabilia (effects of a certain value, usually in excess of £s, but an amount varying in different places and often dependent upon fi ne distinctions as to the nature of the property) 3 in another diocese, probate and ad ministration were granted by the Prerogative Court of Canter bury or York.4 And where personal property existed in both provinces two probates and grants of letters were necessary. 5 Also, if it appeared, after letters were duly granted by an ordinary ecclesiastical court, that the decedent was possessed of bona notabilia within another jurisdiction, the probate and administration were held to be void.6 Because of the ill defined nature and varying amounts of bona notabilia, the difficulties, inconveniences 'and mistakes incident to the re tention of such doctrine in the law and the consequences of void probates and admil).istrations, the royal commissioners, in 18 32, recommended the abolition of all ecclesiastical pro bate jurisdiction.7 This recommendation was translated into ·1 For a discussion of this development, see I CHITTY, PLEADING (I 809) 
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VENUE an accomplished fact in I 8 57 at which time courts of probate were established fully coordinate with the common-law courts at Westminster.8
The doctrine of bona notabilia never found its way 'into this country.9 It is true that vestig � s of the practice of requiring separate administrations on decedents' est�tes where property was found in more than one county may be noted in some early American statutes.10 At the present time, however, the juris diction of a probate court extends to �11 property of a decedent in any county in the state. But what county do the .statutes designate for the probate of wills and the administration of estates, and what county should they designate in the interest of convenience and efficiency?
Such designation should primarily serve the ends of con venience, and aid in the prompt and efficient administration of estates. In laying down general rules designed to serve those ends it may be expected that a certain degree of arbitrari ness will appear, but it should be kept at a minimum. Fixed rules seem largely to prevail in many old statutes still operating at the present time. Although some of these statutes served well enough in former times when one's domicile, that of his nearest of kin, and most of his property were all likely to be confined to a single county, they are not always the most satis factory under modern conditions. The sole justification for fixed rules in determining venue lies in the necessity for hav ing something predetermined t o go by, and in resolving conflicts when they do occur. A definite trend away from an absolute fixation of venue is clearly evident in the more recent probate statutes and codes, 11 particularly in the case 
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MONOGRAPHS ON PROBATE LAW of nonresidents. As will be observed from the text of the proposed Model Probate Code 12 a maximum latitude of choice is given to those who will ordinarily take the initiative in such matters, on the assumption that convenience will govern that choice within the ·permitted limits.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the statutes under consideration are statutes of venue and not statutes upon which the jurisdiction of courts is predicated. Jurisdiction means power to hear and adjudicate.13 Venue refers only to the choice or designation of a particular county in which the pro bate proceedings should be instituted and carried through to Kan. Gen "(a) Proper county. The venue for the probate of a will and for administra tion shall be : "(I) In the county in this state where the decedent had his domicile at the time of his death.
"(2) If the decedent had no domicile in this state, then in any county wherein he left any property or into which any property belonging to his estate may have come.
"(b) Proceedings in more than one county. If proceedings are commenced in more than one county, they shall be stayed except in the county where first commenced until final determination of venue in the county where fi rst com menced. If the proper venue is finally determined to be in another county, the court, after making and retaining a true copy of the entire file, shall transmit the original to the proper county. The proceeding shall be deemed commenced by the filing of a petition ; and the proceeding first legally commenced shall extend to all of the property of the estate in this state.
"(c) Transfer of proceeding. If it appears .to the court at any time before the decree of final distribution in any proceeding that the proceeding was commenced in the wrong county or that it would be for the best interests of the estate, the court, in its discretion, may order the proceeding with all papers, files and a certified copy of all orders therein transferred to another [ ] court which other court shall thereupon proceed to complete the administration pro ceeding as if originally commenced therein." VENUE 531 completion.14 Power or jurisdi c tion to entertain and super vise the administration of estates is conferred generally upon probate courts ; venue is the means of dividing or allocating the work among all of the probate courts in the state.15 It has even been suggested that there is but one probate court in e<�:ch state with a branch in each county., 16
I. FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE VENUE A. A VENUE STATUTE, NOT A JURISDICTION STATUTE
Under the early statutes designating the particular court in which wills should be probated and administration granted it was usually provided that the court in the county wherein the deceased resided at the time of his death should have "juris diction" to grant probate and letters of administration. Death and residence within the county were essential "jurisdictional" facts to be alleged and found by the court. But if either of these was not true in fact, it was said that all proceedings were utterly void and could be attacked at any time, directly or in direct! y. Notice to interested parties given by a court without jurisdiction was regarded · as no notice at all. "The persons interested cannot be required to watch the proceedings of all the Probate Courts of the State, at all times," said the Caliu I BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) II5. 15 In the words of Mr. Justice Rugg, "The distinction between jurisdiction and venue is plainly established. . . . Jurisdiction is a term of comprehensive import. It concerns and defines the power of judicatories and ' court. It embraces every kind of judicial action touching the subject of the action, suit, petition, complaint, indictment or other proceeding. It includes power to inquire into facts, to apply the law, to make decision and to declare judgment. . . • Venue in its modern and municipal sense relates to and defines the particular county or territorial area within the State or district in which the cause or prgsecu tion must be brought or tried. It commonly has to do with geographical sub divisions, relates to practice or procedU£e, may be waived, and does not refer to jurisdiction at all. 
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fornia court in an early case.17 "The proceedings are sum mary and special, and must be in strict conformity with the law." Such was the common attitude toward probate c o urts, at that time regarded as inferior tribunals whose proceedings must conform in fact to every requirement of the statute. In the course of time a very substantial body of authority accumulated which construed such statutes as limiting the jurisdiction of probate courts to the administration of estates of decedents who had actually died domiciled within their geographical limits; yet despite the court's own determination of this so-called "j urisdictional" fact, such determination re mained open to attack in subsequent and collateral proceed ings. The result was chaotic. Seve r al administrations could be instituted and carried on in different counties at the same time, and debtors subjected to multitudinous actions by dif ferent executors or administrators of the same estate. Con fusi.on and uncertainty were in the ascendant. No one could depend upon the title to property obtained through a probate sale. The net effect on titles to real estate was well nigh disastrous.
Gradually, however, the position of probate courts has risen in the law's esteem. Made courts of record in most states, accorded presumptions by statute as to the validity and regularity of their proceedings, and made coordinate with courts of general jurisdiction in a few states, they began to lose their inferiority.18 The utterly indefensible holdings that the jurisdiction of probate courts could be attacked col laterally at any time and all dependent proceedings held for nought were destined to fall. Faith in judicial proceedings was felt to be just as important in probate matters as else where. A court may erroneously assume to act in � given VENUE 5 33
case. Today its action may be erroneous but ordinaril y it is not void.
.
Nevertheless there remains a small body of authority which continues to construe venue statutes as limiting the jurisdiction of probate courts and making their determinations of jurisdiction inconclusive. Two administration proceedings may be carried on simultaneously, and third parties su b ject e d to two actions for the same thing, without any assu r ance as to which will be upheld. Fortunately, however, this possibility is confi ned to two states at the most and is not likely to survive much longer the tests of time and necessity.
B. ESTATES OF RESIDENT DECEDENTS .
In formulating a statute specifying the county w h ere th e will of a resident decedent should be probated and his estate administered upon, convenience of the persons interested should control.19 Two elements exist here: convenience as to assets of the estate; and convenience as to parties. Both of these may and usually do suggest the same place. Assets may consist of land, tangible personalty, intangible personalty, and causes of action to be instituted or prosecuted. At times there may be actions to be defended. The various parties in � olved include heirs and distributees, witnesses who may be called upon to prove 't:h_e will or to testify in proceedings, and per sons to be consulted by the executor or administrator in con nection with the administration of the estate.
For resident decedents, the designation in every statute of th e venue for probate and administration is the county of MONOGRAPHS 0� PROBATE LAW residence or doJ11icile.20 In the vast maj ority of cases this will be the f!lOSt convenient place in terms of the elements men tioned. On the basis of convenience and of the universal ac ceptance of this single formula in the case of resident dece dents, its retention seems a desirable one.
The phraseology of all present statutes is to the effect that administration is to be had in the county in which the decedent was a resident or an inhabitant or where he was domiciled. A very few designate venue as �he county where he had his mansion house. 21 All of these phrases are interpreted as , equivalent to domicile.22 A few recent statutes employ the term "domicile" 2 3 because it has a more definite and fixed legal meaning. This would seem to be the preferable term for determining venue.
diction, though it may admit venue." Concurring opinion in Southern Sand and Gravel Co., Inc. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel Corp., 145 Va. 3 r 7 at 332, 133 S. E. 8r2 (1926) . ,., Only one significant deviation from this universal formula has been noted. In Alabama a testator may designate the county where administration is to be had on his estate provided he owns property in such county at the time of his death. Ala. Code (r94o) t. 6r, § 35· Another section provides that when a resident decedent dies intestate and leaves no assets subject to administration in the county of his residence, and no administration is granted in such county within three months after his death, then administration may be granted in any county where he leaves assets. Ala. Code (r94o) t. 6r, § 8o. ·Both of these sections are designed to serve the interests of convenience.
In all the citations which follow, reference is made to provisions dealing ·with the probate of wills as well as administration upon estates. A few statutes are explicit to the eff. ect that if probate is had in a given court, administration must also be had there, and vice versa. Others are silent on the subject. While either may be had without the other, clearly they shduld be in the same· court even though not applied for at the same time. 
C. ESTATES OF NONRESIDENT DECEDENTS
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In the case of nonresident decedents the factors determin ing venue are quite differen� in most cases. The domicile of the decedent and presumably of his family has been elsewhere. The convenience of the heirs and distributees must be in terms of access to the assets of the estate and to the place of adminis tration. Convenience for the executor or administrator may correspond or differ. Localization of assets is no longer even a theoretical possibility. 2 4 Both tangible and intangible assets may be located in several counties. Consequently it is not surprising to find each state groping for its own formula, each predicated upon some assumed relation between the localiza tion of assets and the place of administration.
In nearly all of the existing statutes designating venue in cases of nonresidents, elaborate provisions are found specify ing one or more of the following places as the venue for ad ministration : the county ( I ) where the decedent's land or the greater part (or any part) thereof lies ; 2 5 ( 2) where his personal estate or the greater part (or any part) thereof is located ; 2 6 (3) where his estate or the greater part (or ;my part) thereof is located ; 27 ( 4) where the decedent died ; any debt or demand owing to him; 33 (I o) where the personal 'representative or kin of such person has a cause of action; 34 or (I I) where any suit in which the estate is interested is to be brought, prosecuted or defended. 35 And in most of them preference or priority is prescribed in a designated order, though all too often without regard to the convenience of any one. In some instances the presence of land in the state gives precedence over personalty in the determination of venue.36 In other statutes the very opposite is true.37 It is not easy to reconcile these different forms or amounts of wealth as a basis for determining venue. The place of death itself would' ·seem to bear no relation to the convenience of anyone insofar as the task of administration is concerned, and yet the county of death is designated as the venue in a surprisingly large number of states, due, no doubt, to the persistent influence of the English ecclesiastical courts, which sometimes authorized probate and administration in the diocese where death oc curred.38 The proximity of the executor, administrator and distributees to the assets of the estate would ordinarily serve their convenience better than an administration in a distant county compelled by the pr � v i sions of an arbitrary statute. The importance of this matter can be appreciated where prop erty is to be looked after, rents collected, or a business con-' tinued or liquidated. 
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After the varied provisions of all the statutes are compared and considered, it seems clear that little advantage is to be gained by a rigid designation of venue. Choice within limits might well be left to those persons who will take the initiative in applying for letters and who will likely be appointed to undertake the task of looking after the estate. 39 A statute with flexible provisions permitting a degree of freedom may be considered as operating in a medium of individual choices ; and in most cases individual choices will be guided largely by convemence.
Doubtless this obj ective has been paramount in those states having statutes authorizing probate and administration of the estate of a nonresident in any county in which assets of the de cedent are located. The presence in any county of assets be longing or due to an estate is an essential and at the same time sufficient condition for a probate court to entertain proceed ings for the administration of the estate of a nonresident.
II. P owER oF P RoBATE C ouRTS TO D ETERMINE V ENUE
In order for a probate court to grant letters testamentary or of administration there must first be a showing of death. To invoke action by a particular probate court it must be shown secondly that the decedent was domiciled in the � ounty at the time of his death, or, in the case of a nonresident (under the terms of many present statutes), that he died within the county 39 One Texas statute goes so far as to permit administration in the county of ap plicant's residence where the only purpose is to appoint an administrator to re ceive funds from the federal government. Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3293A. A companion statute, based upon presumed convenience,·Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1939) art. 3293, provides that administration on the estate of a nonresident decedent who died out of the state may be had in the county where his next of kin reside.
As the last of several enumerated,places of venue in Missouri, probate and ad ministration may be granted in any county in the state. Mo. Rev. Stat, Ann. ( 1942) § § 4 and 531· ' These are but isolated instances confined within a narrow compass.
VENUE 5 39
or that some part of his property is located within the county. 40 The judicial determination of the existence of these facts is the basis upon which all subsequent proceedings depend. The important thing to observe in this connection is that the same tribunal which proposes to undertake the administration of an estate also passes upon the very facts necessary to entitle it to do so. This necessity and power to make such a determination corresponds to a similar necessity and power long recognized to exist in courts of general jurisdiction. And such a deter mination must conclude other courts -in the same state.
These two facts are often called "jurisdictional facts�" 41 Only death is strictly a jurisdictional fact. If the alleged decedent were not dead, the proceedings purporting to ad minister and distribute his property would be wholly void. 42
The second fact-of do ;n icile within the county, or death within or the location of assets within the county in the case of a nonresident decedent-is not truly a jurisdictional fact, although many courts have so treated it, as will be pointed out presently. A court may entertain and allow an administra...: tion to proceed to completion, as if local domicile were a reality. At most the statutory directi � ns for venue are violated. This is not deemed a serious error as long as there is no conflict with a probate court in another county, and ' it would serve no useful purpose to require a new and separate administration again in another county. 
Ill. CoNFLICTS OF VENUE
A. AS TO .RESIDENT DECEDENTS Despite the avowed. purpose of statutes to limit the super.:. vision of decedents' estates to one probate court, it is easily possible that administrations may be commenced independ ently in two or more counties within the same state more or less simultaneously. In the case of resident decedents it may b� alleged and judicially determined by each of two ur more probate courts that the decedent died domiciled in the same county where the court is located. This has happened in a number of instances. Let us look into the results of such · competing jurisdictions.
In the first place this duplication, or possibly triplication, of effort is quite unnecessary. There is no justifi cation for more than one tribunal to 'l;lndertake the administration. In the second place an unseemly competition between two courts of equal jurisdiction is highly undesirable. Such judicial rivalry cannot be tolerated under any system. Furthermore, confusion, uncertainty and positive injustices may result. Each of two or more executors or administrators may seek to take possession of the same assets belonging to the estate; each may seek to recover debts owing to the estate. In either situation a person may be subjected to more than one action brought for the same purpose. An interplea,der or correspondordered an examination to discover assets held by the administrator to whom letters had been first granted in another county, and threatened contempt pro ceedings for refusal.
"Explicit statutes precluding collateral attaCk are now found in many states. See notes 66-78, infra. VENUE 54 I ing remedy is possible for such a person, but he would be justified in feeling that a properly drafted probate coc;le should eliminate such a possibility. Real estate titles traced through an administration may be subject to different paths and dif ferent ownerships, depending upon which administration is regarded as the controlling on � . Such a condition still persists in Kentucky and Rhode Island.45 It existed in Kansas until remedied by the probate code adopted there in I 9 3 9· 46 Many other states likewise formerly adhered to this view. 47
Where such a view prevailed in the past, one difficulty was no doubt due to the judicial construction of the local statutes, many of which were phrased in terms of "jurisdiction" rather than "venue. The soundness of the Rhode Island position has recently been questioned by its supreme court in Eckilson v. Greene, 6 r R. I. 3 94, I A. (2d) I I 7 (I 9 3 8) in view of R. I. Gen. Laws (I938) c. 569, §I (enacted since the decision in the Wilcox case), to the effect that "The jurisdiction assumed in any case by the court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, shall not be contested in any suit or proceedings except in the original case or an appeal therein or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."
• \Vhen proceedings have been begun in two separate pro bate courts more or less simultaneously, the determination of priority may be simply resolved by requiring courts in which ((proceedings are commenced" second in point of time to with hold action so long as jurisdiction over the estate has been as sumed and continues to be exercised by the first court. In other words, such jurisdiction first assumed by one court is not subject to collateral attack. The applicable Wisconsin statute 66 is typical : uThe jurisdiction assumed by any county court in any case, so far as it depends on the place of residence of any person or the location of his estate, shall not be contested in any action or proceeding whatsoever except on appeal from the county court in the original case or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the same record."
The same language, in substance, is contained in the statutes of California/7 Kansas, 68 Maine, 69 Massach usetts/0 Mich- ( r ) by revocation of letters in the first court ; ( 2.) by appeal from the decision of thaJ court ; or (3) by collateral attack when the "want of jurisdiction appears on the same record."
The application of these provisions against collateral attack would seem to prevent another probate court from granting letters on the same estate. But even though a second grant 
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of letters is not contested, and thus not made the subject of · attack, the probate court there should nevertheless defer or stay all action until the determination by the first court has become final. Thus if it sho u ld be duly determined in the first court, or on appeal from that court, that the decedent's domicile was not in its county, then the proceedings there should be dismissed, and the proceedings next begun in an other county should continue. If perchance a third court were involved, the same rule as to stay should likewise apply to it. This idea of a positive duty on the part of other courts to stay proceedings first found form in the Minnesota statute 79 referred to above and was later embodied in the Kansas Pro bate Code 80 with one slight amendment. All this, of course, . implies V ? luntary obedience by the courts which entertain proceedings later in point of time, or compulsory obedience by appropriate proceedings in a superior or supervisory tribunal. 81 The net result is orderly procedure and the ex ercise of jurisdiction at any given time by one court only. While this method may, in isolated instances, result in a determination of domicile, and hence place of administration, in a place not too convenient to some of the interested parties, it has the advantages of orderly procedure, the exercise of jurisdiction at any given time by one court only, the avoidance of duplication of function by the courts, and the prevention of more than one action against a debtor to the estate. Also the effect upon titles is salutary where conflict between courts cannot have more than momentary duration.
Perhaps it is not enough to say that when proceedings have been commenced in one court, similar proceedings shall be stayed elsewhere. It may be well to add that · the jurisdiction assumed by the first court is not only exclusive and exhaustive but also that any action of a second court is void. The idea is implicit in the fundamental conception of probate jurisdiction that where one court assumes jurisdiction over the adminis tration of an estate, the exercise of control by another court over such estate is thereby exhausted and any attempted or purported exercise of control by another court is void. In short, the power is exclusive; its exercise by one court exhausts the power, subject to the condition that if such court should relinquish its control over the estate, the power would be subj ect to exercise anew by another court.
B. AS TO NONRESIDENT DECEDENTS
In the case of resident decedents it has been observed that confl icts in jurisdiction may arise because of two or more in dependent determinations of domicile within the state. As far as any one state is concerned, it has been generally as sumed that a person could have but one legal domicile within the state. Hence by some final determination, either in the probate court first entertaining jurisdiction or on appeal from that court, the fact of domicile will be determined so as to be binding throughout the state as far as that administration is concerned. In other words, only one court is entitled to under take the administration in the first instance.
82
In the case of nonresident decedents there may be a real choice as to venue in two different situations. In addition there is a third situation in which each of two'or more probate courts may undertake an administration proceeding approxi mately concurrently on the basis of an erroneous representa tion and a finding that the necessary factual basis for venue exists. Each of -these situations contains the seeds for two or more simultaneous administrations with their attendant evils. Each deserves a metho d of resolution.
The first two present genuine choices open to those who may be interested in applying for administration. Thus one type of statute provides in effect that letters may be granted in any county where the decedent left assets. 83 Companion statutes here frequently add that the court of that county in which application is first made, and which first grants letters or otherwise assumes jurisdiction, shall have exclusive juris diction ; 84 or that "the jurisdiction assumed by any court, insofar as it depends on the location of the decedent's estate, shall not be contested except on appeal or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." 85 Another common type of statute in the western states modeled after the California Code specifies various bases of venue in categorical order and particularly provides that venue "in all other cases shall be in the county where application for letters is first made." 86 Both of these species of statutes providing for alternative places of venue, it will be noted, deal with cases where any one of several courts is entitled, in the first instance, to under take the administration on a particular estate. Once pro ceedings have been commenced in any court, all the estate of VENUE 5 47 the decedent is brought under its jurisdiction and control, 87 and further jurisdiction in any other court is no longer pos sible. Resolution of the conflict here is sometimes, but not always, contained in the statute itself or in the companion statutes mentioned above, Priority in time determines the power to proceed.
The third possibility mentioned above in which conflicts are likely to occur, arises, to put an example, under statutes authorizing the administration of estates in the county where the land or estate of the nonresident decedent, or the greater part thereof, is located. Courts of two different counties may grant administration upon the belief that the greater part of the decedent's estate lies there. Mathematically the "greater" part may be in only one county, but before undertaking such measurement, such jurisdiction needs .. definition in terms of value, area, size, or some other appropriate measuring stick. Without pursuing this thought further, it is sufficient to point out that each of two or more courts may honestly believe itself justified in assuming jurisdiction according to its measure ment of an extraneous fact upon which its jurisdiction is made to depend. Again we must fall back upon the simple ex pedient of recognizing that the first court to acquire juris- 87 The term "jurisdic t ion" as used here re,fers merely to the power of a court to take cognizance of the proceedings and control over the property through the executor or administrator. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, its control ex tends to all property of the estate throughout the state. Ala. Code (1940) diction is entitled to retain it,88 subj ect to deprivation of that jurisdiction only in the manner indicated.
c.· WHEN JURISDICTION IS ACQUIRED In addition to the statutes which specify priority as between two or more permissible places of administration according to the county in which the application for letters is first filed,89 many statutes provide that the court in which proceedings are "first commenced" 90 or "first legally commenced," 91 or the court "where administration is first lawfully granted" 92 or which shall "first take cognizance thereof by the commence ment of proceedings" 93 shall be entitled to retain jurisdiction over the administration of the estate to the exclusion of all other probate courts within the state. It is thereby intended to specify the time when<a court acquires control and to declare an order of priority as between two or more courts. A defini tion of this precise point of time is essential whenever legal proceedings are in rem. This problem has been an acute one in states without any specific legislation on the subj ect as well as under the variously phrased statutes mentioned above. From an examination of the statutes and decisions it appears that there are two views as to just when a court acquires juris-88 Bremer v. Lake Erie & W. R. R., 318 Ill. 11, 148 N. E. 862 (192.5) Laws (1932) c. 215, § 7; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 27.3178 (22) (2) when the court, acting on the application, appoints an executor or administrator to adminis ter the estate, thus assuming control· over it.
The first view is predicated upon the theory that the pro ceedings are commenced by the filing of a petition for ad ministration ; and that the subsequent action of the court in acting on the petition is but a continuation and part of the proceedings already commenced. The simple lo d ging of the petition for letters vests the court with jurisdiction and con.:. trol, precluding action by another court. A few statutes specifically provide that a probate proceeding may be com menced by filing a petition and causing it to be set for hearing. 94
The second view stems from the theory of res judicata, that where two actions involving the same issue are pending at the same time, the first one to be determined by final judg ment shall control and may serve as a bar in any other action . between the same parties involving that same issue.95 This, of course, is a well-recognized rule of civil procedure. Ju dicial action, not the mere filing of a petition, is the sine qua non of jurisdiction.
It has also been said that a court can only acquire jurisdiction in an in rem proceeding by doing some act which is equivalent to seizing the res ; that since a probate proceeding is in rem, no jurisdiction over the estate can exist until the court does some affirmative act amounting to a seizure, such as appoint ing a personal representative to take charge of the estate.
Undoubtedly in the vast majority of cases the court to Okla. 177, 245 P. 632 (1926) .
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which a petition is first presented will likewise be the first to grant letters. But such is not always the case, especially where notice for a hearing on the · petition must be given for a specified minimum length of time. A second court to which a petition is later addressed may speed up its action to such a degree that it is the first to grant letters. Thus where the hearing and order are in reverse order to that of the filing of the applications, it becomes important to determine the precise time when jurisdiction may be said to attach so as to preclude jurisdiction by another court.
The authorities are divided in their views on this point. Among the states having statutes specifying jurisdiction upon the commencement of proceedings, or having no legislation on the subject, New York,96 Minnesota,97 Missouri,98 Kansas,99 North Dakota/00 and Texas 101 are committed to the first view, saying that the commencement of administration proceedings by the filing of a petition is conclusive as to the time when the court acquires jurisdiction ; 102 and that any subsequent proceeding in any other court is without juris diction and void. The New York statute, for example, pro- REV. 192 (r936) . Here the court said that the . order of appointment controlled, but that this related back to the "very inception of the proceedings" when the will and application for letters were filed. 9° Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1943 102 In ,addition to these five states, there are some 24 additional states where statutes· specify the time of application under certain circumstances as equivalent to the time when jurisdiction may be said to attach. See note 84, supra. This makes a total of 29 states where the filing of the application may be said to confer jurisdiction, at least to the extent of determining priority over other courts of coordinate authority.
vides that "j urisdiction, once duly exercised over any matter by a Surrogate's" Court, excludes the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction by another Surrogate's Court over the same mat ter. . .. " It was held at a very early date under this statute that the presentation of a petition for probate, alleging resi dence of the decedent within the county, gives exclusive juris diction to try the question of residence, of which the court cannot be deprived by subsequent proceedings in the sur rogate's court of another county.103 In addition, statutes exist in twenty-eight states explicitly giving priority in given cir cumstances to the court in which an application for letters is first fi led.
The second view also has its adherents. Delaware/04 Indiana/05 Nebraska/06 New Hampshire/07 Ohio/08 Okla homa, 109 Rhode Island 11 0 and South Carolina 111 do not regard their probate courts as acquiring jurisdiction without some positive action, such as acting on an application by granting letters. Such judicial order or judgment, they say, is the only means by which the court may grasp jurisdiction. 1 12 A dozen . applications may be pending in as many different courts, but jurisdiction exists in none until acted upon. Thus in an early California case it was said that the statute in effect at that time did not contemplate the "presentation of a petition as the means of giving the Court jurisdiction," but as information to the court.113
In addition, statutes exist in Connecticut,114 Iowa,115 Maine, 116 Massachusetts, 117 Michigan, 11 8 North Carolina, 119 Vermont 1 20 and Wisconsin 121 to the effect that the court which shall fi rst take cognizance of the administration of an estate by the commencement of proceedings shall be entitled to retain it to the exclusion of every other court. Thus far, these statutes have received no clear judic i al construction as to just when proceedings are commenced.
In favor of the first rule it has been said to be fairer to predicate priority on the filing of the first petition, provided the respective applications for administration have not been made with such haste as to suggest some positive fraud or col lusion. As said in a Texas case: 122 "The fairest and most reasonable test is priority in invoking the exercise of jurisdiction.
. The date of an adjudica-113 In the Matter of the Estate of Howard, 22 Cal. 395 at 398 ( I 863) . How ever, the court here was discussing two statutes entirely dissimilar to those under consideration. The sole purpose of quoting from the opinion is to indicate the early conception of. the California court as to the office of the petition for probate. Indeed the opinion indicated that a petition was solely for the purpose of indicat ing to the court a willingness on the part of the executor to accept his trust. In addition to this section, another Massachusetts statute is unique in providing that "If it appears before final decree in any proceeding pending in a probate court tha,t said proceeding was begun in the wrong county, said court may order the proceeding with all papers relating thereto to be removed to the probate court for the proper county, and it shall thereupon be entered and pending in the last mentioned court as if originally commenced therein, and all prior proceedings otherwise regularly taken shall thereupon be valid." Mass. Ann. Laws ( I937) tion on his application may be delayed by circumstances be yond the applicant's control, such as the number of causes on the court's docket or time taken by the court to render a decision. One ought not to lose his right to an adjudication, properly sought, because a clerk or sheriff is delayed in issuing or serving process duly applied for, nor because an earlier adjudication is secured from another court."
Such a rule makes the acquisition of jurisdiction independent of the speed with which-two probate courts might otherwise move toward acquiring jurisdiction by granting letters sooner than they would in the ordinary course of events. Where such application is for domiciliary administration and predi cated upon domicile, fraud or collusion, if it exists, may be corrected in most cases in the probate court itself or by ap peal.123 If there is any weakness in the first view, it may be exempli fied by supposing that the first of two courts in which applica tion for letters has been filed, refuses to grant letters or otherwise proceed. T he sudden cessation of a jurisdiction ov�r the decedent's estate which the court says it never had, seems an anomaly. In answer it may be said that jurisdiction, or the potential power to assume jurisdiction, exists from the instant the application was filed, but the court terminates its jurisdiction and thus makes it possible for another court to take it up. This corresponds to the express statutory state ment that proceedings may be commenced by the mere filing of a petition for probate or administration. Where such
